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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a new theory of the rm where the market is primarily an
incentive system whereas the rm is an intrinsic motivation device. The rm is more
ecient than the market when asset specicity and subjective risk are suciently high
because it provides balanced incentives, fosters intrinsic motivation, and economizes on
risk. An ecient rm is unambiguously the more ethical institution in the sense that
the component of production eort due to intrinsic motivation and the agent's rents in
exchange for commitment are higher. The exception is when the market approximates the
rst best.
JEL Classications: M14, M52, L14, D86, D02.
Keywords: authority, endogenous preferences, incentives, intrinsic motivation, markets,
multi-tasking, relational contracts, theory of the rm.
y We thank Jimmy Walker, Birger Wernerfelt, and participants in the Workshop in Political Theory
and Policy Analysis at Indiana University (2008) and the International Industrial Organization Conference
(2009) for comments.Why do rms exist? What is their function, and what determines their scope? These remain
the central questions in the economics of organization.
Holmstr om and Roberts (1998, p. 73)
1. Introduction
In the theory of the rm, the latter is often characterized as essentially an incentive device.
In Alchian and Demsetz (1972), the rm is more ecient than the market at monitoring
team production, where \monitoring" is broadly dened (p. 782) to include incentive
provision; in Holmstr om (1982) the rm takes the form of a budget-breaker who provides
appropriate incentives; and in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)
the rm provides ecient investment incentives. Although incentives are weak in rms in
Holmstr om and Milgrom (1991, 1994), the rm is still an incentive device which balances
competing incentives for diverse inside and outside activities. Indeed, the title of their
1994 paper is \The rm as an incentive system."
In this paper, we develop a new theory of the rm as an intrinsic motivation device.
In our model, rms exist to motivate transactions where explicit monetary incentives
have high transaction costs. Since high-powered incentives cannot be provided, a central
function of management is to develop and maintain an eective institutional culture. The
other main objective of the paper is understand the roles that incentives and intrinsic
motivation serve in both institutions. In our model, these are strategic substitutes and
while the market is primarily an incentive system, the rm is an intrinsic motivation device.
Our starting point is the multi-tasking theory of the rm in Holmstr om and Milgrom
(1991, section 3) (HM91). We chose this framework because it is standard, analytically
tractable, and provides a unied account of both the rm and the market (non-integration
or independent contracting). As in Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990),
the institution is dened by asset ownership: in the rm the principal owns the asset and
in the market the agent does. The multi-tasking problem dictates low-powered incentives
in rms. To make the rm a viable institution with weak incentives, HM91 assume an
exogenous amount of intrinsic motivation in the sense that the agent's least-cost action is
positive, so that some eort is supplied even with zero incentives.
1In this paper, we complete the HM91 theory of the rm with the theory of endogenous
intrinsic motivation in Casadesus-Masanell (2004) (CM04). In CM04, institutional culture
is an equilibrium phenomenon where the principal establishes the culture and the agent
chooses the degree to which he internalizes it.1 As in Akerlof (1983), Rotemberg (1994),
and Tabellini (2008), preferences are therefore endogenous and strategically chosen by the
agent (or his parents). This literature is also closely related to the economics of identity,
especially Akerlof and Kranton (2005). We chose the CM04 theory of intrinsic motivation
because it eectively endogenizes the agent's least-cost action and therefore complements
the existing framework in HM91. More importantly, multiple case studies including those in
Akerlof (1982, 1983), Roberts (2004), and Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2008), emphasize the
equilibrium aspect of institutional culture in that both active management and employee
buy-in (or internalization) are crucial.
In our model, the rm has two main distinguishing characteristics. First, the multi-
tasking problem implies zero (but balanced) incentives, so the rm operates solely on
the basis of endogenous intrinsic motivation. Second, the lack of incentives makes the
agent indierent between production and asset maintenance and necessitates a relational
contract as in Coase (1937) or the exercise of allocative authority as in Simon (1951). This
characterization of the rm mirrors that in HM91, except that now the viability of the
rm is a result rather than an assumption of the model.
We then move beyond HM91 and show that the market is characterized by its own
multi-tasking problem which diers from that in the rm. Although HM91 introduce
intrinsic motivation for the express purpose of making the rm viable with zero incentives,
the multi-tasking problem in the market implies that it too cannot survive without it when
the level of subjective risk (objective risk scaled by the agent's degree of risk aversion) is
suciently high. Furthermore, the rm is more ecient than the market when subjective
risk is suciently high (as in HM91) AND the asset is suciently specic.2 The latter
condition is new because HM91 do not consider participation constraints.
1 CM04 analyzes the three separate cases of altruism, ethical standards, and norms, but in this paper
we only consider the second.
2 A specic asset is one whose value in its next best alternative use is essentially zero. See Holmstr om
and Roberts (1998) for further discussion and examples.
2Having characterized each institution, we then turn to the second main objective of
the paper, which is to understand the role that intrinsic motivation serves in each. This
is an age-old question addressed by Smith, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and many others.
In the classical literature, the market is often depicted as an essentially \cold" institution
dominated by the autonomous price mechanism.
The market community as such is the most impersonal relationship of practical life into which
humans can enter with one another... Where the market is allowed to follow its own autonomous
tendencies, its participants do not look toward the persons of each other but only toward the
commodity; there are no obligations of brotherliness or reverence, and none of those spontaneous
human relations that are sustained by personal unions. They all would just obstruct the free
development of the bare market relationship, and its specic interests serve, in their turn, to
weaken the sentiments on which these obstructions rest.
Max Weber, Economy and Society (1978, p. 636).
In his survey on endogenous preferences, Bowles (1998) presents empirical, experimental,
and eld evidence drawn from across the social sciences to support his contention that
Walrasian grocery markets support personal interactions quite distinct from the long term
relationship characteristic of a lifelong employment rm; and the dierences in the structure of
these exchanges appear to have eects on preferences...
(p. 78)
Recent experimental evidence is consistent with that view, in the sense that subjects
tend to behave in a self-interested manner in market and auction-type settings but exhibit
other-regarding preferences in environments like the dictator, ultimatum, and gift exchange
games; see Fehr and G achter (2000), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt
(2007), and Ostrom and Walker (2007). One potential explanation is that preferences and
institutions are independent, but that certain institutions restrict the kind of preferences
which can be observed; see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Falk
and Fischbacher (2006), Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, and Sobel (2008), and
Sobel (2008). In perfectly competitive markets, agents with other-regarding preferences
will nevertheless appear purely self-interested because they cannot in
uence the market
price or trade volume. As summarized in the title of Sobel (2008), \Markets Make People
Appear Selsh."
In this paper, we develop the complementary view in Bowles (1998) that institutions
and preferences are not independent and that the former can in
uence the latter. We also
3supplement that view with the recognition that institutions are endogenous in the long
run. In that case, a comparison of observed institutions will be between ecient ones
and we contrast the equilibrium level of intrinsic motivation in an ecient rm versus an
ecient market. A seminal insight of CM04 is that institutional culture is an equilibrium
phenomenon supported by material rewards for those who internalize it. In our model,
an ecient rm is more ethical than an ecient market in the sense that the principal's
expenditure on intrinsic motivation is higher in the former. Furthermore, the component of
production eort attributable to intrinsic motivation (controlling for incentives) is greater
in an ecient rm except when subjective risk is relatively low. The market is therefore
primarily (but not exclusively) an incentive system while the rm is an intrinsic motivation
device.
Tabellini (2008) considers similar issues within a version of the prisoner's dilemma
where players have an endogenous preference for cooperation chosen partly by their parents.
There can exist two steady-states (see his proposition 9) | one with a strong endogenous
enforcement mechanism (the probability of detecting and punishing defectors) and where
the majority of players have a strong preference for cooperation, and another steady-state
with the opposite properties. Unlike this paper, incentives and intrinsic motivation are
therefore strategic complements.
The closest paper to ours is Rotemberg (2006), who considers the formation of altruism
in rms and markets. In his paper, rms have an inherent advantage over markets because
monitoring can also lead to product improvements. Given this advantage, altruism is less
valuable in the rm and Rotemberg provides sucient conditions (see his theorems 2 and
3) such that the rm prefers to deal with altruistic independent contractors rather than
selsh employees.
Rob and Zemsky (2002) develop a dynamic model of the rm (the sole exogenous
institution) with a continuum of risk neutral agents. In each period, agents allocate eort
between an individual and a cooperative task, where the latter is more protable but the
former more easily observed by the principal. The form of intrinsic motivation is similar
to that in CM04, except that the degree of internalization is increasing in past cooperation
(a form of reciprocity). An increase in incentives increases individual eort at the expense
4of cooperative eort in the current period and therefore reduces cooperation in the future.
There are two potential steady-states: a \good" equilibrium with low incentives, high
cooperation, and high prots, and a \bad" equilibrium. As in our model, incentives and
intrinsic motivation are therefore substitutes.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. We present the model in section 2,
characterize the rm in section 3, and the market in section 4. In section 5, we compare
the eects of intrinsic motivation in both institutions when the latter are exogenous and
then endogenous. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. The Model
The agent performs two tasks, production and asset maintenance a (i.e., investment). The
nal value of the asset is f(a) = a   a2, where  is a positive constant.3 As in HM91 (p.
36), the latter is non-contractible (incentives cannot be provided) because asset values are
dicult to measure and verify for enforcement purposes. The principal observes a veriable
signal y = e+y of production eort e, where y is a normally distributed random variable
with mean zero and variance 2. Since y is observable and veriable it is contractible.
In HM91, it is assumed that zero asset maintenance is suboptimal. In this paper, we
capture this with a simple stochastic Leontief production function
q = minfe;ag + q; (1)
where q is output and q is a productivity shock with mean zero and variance 2.4 Note
that a = 0 implies zero expected output, which will be the source of the multi-tasking
problem in the rm. We assume q is non-contractible and both variances are equal to
minimize the number of parameters. The principal is a monopolist or Cournot oligopolist
in the output market with linear demand p =    q, so revenue and expected revenue are
q   q2 and
minfe;ag   minfe;ag2   2; (2)
3 Note that asset value f is decreasing in asset maintenance for all a  =2. We could assume
f(a) = 2=4 for all a  =2 without substantially aecting the results because the agent never chooses a
in that region.
4 We need not make any specic distributional assumptions about q because the principal's payo
function is quadratic and therefore all that matters is its mean and variance.
5respectively. We deliberately assume  is the same in both tasks so we can address the
issue of \balanced" incentives.
Institutional culture is determined as in CM04 (section 4). The principal chooses the
work ethic v to maximize her expected prots, while the agent chooses his commitment
 or degree of internalization to maximize his economic or material payo. An agent
who truly internalizes the principal's work ethic in the sense that  > 0 experiences guilt
G = (1=2)g(v;e;a) when his eorts fall short of the ethical standard v.5 Note that the
agent is free to choose  = 0, in which case he completely ignores the standard. The exact
nature of the work ethic, the guilt function g, and the manner in which  is chosen depend
on institutional specics and are discussed more fully below.
The agent's utility function is negative exponential
 expf r[I   C(t)   G]g; (3)
where r is the agent's coecient of absolute risk aversion, I his income, t = e + a total
eort, and C(t) = (1=2)t2 the cost of total eort. The principal's outside option is zero,
while the agent's u depends on asset ownership. Except for Proposition 9 below, we make
the following assumption throughout the paper.





As in Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and HM91, the rm is dened as
the institution where the principal owns the asset and receives its nal value. We assume
the principal oers a linear contract I =  + y in the signal y, where  is the xed
component and  the piece rate.6 The principal therefore chooses the contract (;) and
the work ethic v, while the agent chooses his degree  of internalization and experiences
5 As Rotemberg (1994) and CM04 emphasize, guilt relates to variables only the agent can observe (e.g.,
eorts subject to moral hazard), whereas shame refers to those others can observe.
6 Given  and v, linear contracts are optimal in the sense of Holmstr om and Milgrom (1987), since we
can re-interpret C + G as the agent's cost function.
6guilt GF = (1=2)(v   t)2 when his total eort t falls short of the standard.7 Since the
agent does not own any assets, his outside option u is zero if he rejects the principal's
contract.
The Market
The market is dened as the institution where the agent owns the asset. As in the rm,
the principal oers a contract (;) and establishes the work ethic v, but now the agent
owns the asset, receives its nal value f(a), and experiences no guilt with respect to its
maintenance. Instead, his guilt GM = (1=2)(v   e)2 is based solely on his production
eort on behalf of the principal, which is the only task subject to moral hazard.
Since the agent owns the asset, his outside option u depends on how valuable it is
outside the relationship. If the asset is specic then u = 0. At the opposite extreme, the
agent receives the full value of independent investment
u = argmax
a0
f(a)   C(a) = 2=6 > 0: (4)
In general, 0  u  2=6 and the exact value of u depends on the degree of asset specicity.
Note that Assumption 1 restricts u and rules out (4).
Timing of the Game
The timing of the game is as follows. (1) The principal and agent allocate asset ownership
through Coasian bargaining (i.e., they choose the ecient institution). (2) The agent
chooses his degree  of internalization to maximize his material payo. (3) The principal
decides whether or not to oer a contract and, if so, what the contract (;) and work
ethic v should be. (4) The agent decides whether or not to accept the contract and, if so,
how much eort to devote to each task. (5) If necessary, the principal chooses the agent's
eorts from the set where the agent is indierent.
7 The agent therefore experiences guilt when t > v, which may seem unnatural. It can be shown,
however, that the alternative assumption GF = 0 for all t  v produces essentially the same results. Like
Akerlof (1982, Example 2) and CM04, we do not consider pride in the sense of increased utility when
t > v. Note that v in our model corresponds to the norm en in Akerlof (1982) and not the minimum
standards e+
min and e 
min. The behavior of the poster girls at Eastern Utilities, in exceeding the minimum
work standard, is therefore not necessarily inconsistent with the results of our model.
7Discussion
We now discuss the CM04 framework in more detail. The uninterested reader can skip
directly to the next section.
In our view, the most attractive feature of the CM04 model is that institutional culture
is an equilibrium phenomenon based on rational self-interest. As the case studies in Akerlof
(1982, 1983), Roberts (2004), and Akerlof and Kranton (2005, 2008) show, institutions such
as Lincoln Electric, the military, and Nokia expend considerable resources developing and
maintaining an eective culture. Such investments would be worthless, however, without
sucient employee \buy-in" and the CM04 model captures both sides of this exchange
through the strategic variables  (chosen by the agent) and v (chosen by the principal).
To be precise, CM04 assumes (i) the agent chooses  to maximize his material payo, (ii)
he can subsequently commit to that choice, and (iii) he can credibly signal the value of 
to the principal. We now discuss each assumption in turn.
We rst distinguish between the agent's total and material (or economic) payos. The
latter is the agent's expected payo in standard principal-agent models, which includes
cash transfers, the disutility of eort, and the risk premium. The former is the agent's
material payo plus the component related to intrinsic motivation or social preferences
(e.g., guilt). According to (i), the agent chooses  to maximize his material rather than
overall payo. This is based on the following conception of the self:
one can think of an \inner" self that is selsh and relinquishes control of actions to an \outer"
self. What the inner self can do, however, is to mold the preferences that guide the outer self's
actions. Thus the inner self can make the outer self altruistic, and this altruism becomes genuine
because the inner self cannot change the outer self's preferences too rapidly.
Rotemberg (1994, p. 690)
In our model, the selsh inner self bargains with the principal over asset ownership in the
rst stage of the game and chooses  to maximize his material payo in each institution
in the second stage. The outer self then takes  as given in deciding whether or not to
accept the contract and, if so, how much eort to supply in each task.
As CM04 notes, this conception of the self is common in psychology, sociology, and
other disciplines. In economics, similar ideas have been used by Smith in The Theory of
Moral Sentiments (the \impartial spectator"), Akerlof (1983), Frank (1987), Raub (1990),
8and Rabin (1993), among others. E.g., Akerlof (1983, p. 54) argues that
Most persons attempt to choose values for their children (and perhaps also for themselves)
according to their economic opportunities that allow them to get along economically. According
to Robert Coles' Children of Crisis, not only the wealthy... but also the poorest of the poor |
immigrants, sharecroppers, and mountaineers | consciously teach their children values aimed at
leading them best to survive economically.
In our model, it does not matter who chooses  (the agent or his parents), as long as it is
chosen to maximize the agent's material payo. The conception of character as an object
of individual choice is also central in virtue ethics in moral philosophy [for an elementary
introduction, see Driver (2007)].
An important insight of CM04 is that altruism, ethical standards, and norms enable
the selsh inner self to extract material rents from the principal because the latter has
to compensate him for all expected losses, including guilt. If the agent can commit to a
higher  and credibly signal this to the principal, the latter will have to increase the xed
component  of the contract to satisfy the participation constraint. Seabright (2004, p.
93) expresses the same mechanism when he writes that
in order to exchange with strangers people need a way to signal their trustworthiness... one
of the most eective ways to do this is to create an identity for yourself, a set of internal rules in
which you yourself believe and by which you live, and which will make you unhappy if you fail to
honor them.
With respect to commitment (ii), Akerlof (1983, p. 57) and Bowles (1998, p. 79-80
and Section 7) discuss evidence that preferences are both endogenous and fairly stable.
In particular, preferences learned in one environment tend to become ingrained and to be
applied in others:
However acquired, preferences are internalized; there is considerable evidence that preferences
learned under one set of circumstances become generalized reasons for behavior. Thus economic
institutions may induce specic behaviors | self-regarding, opportunistic, or cooperative, say |
which then become part of the behavioral repertoire of the individual.
(ibid., p. 80)
As Rotemberg (1994) notes, such commitment may re
ect the inability of the inner self to
change the preferences of the outer self too rapidly. One potential explanation is cognitive
dissonance: if only a limited subset of the agent's attitudes, beliefs, and values can be
modied at any one time, then excessive changes will create unwanted inconsistencies.
9As examples of credible signals, Rotemberg (1994) cites body language and gifts in
the context of altruism, Frank (1987, Section III) lists several physiological symptoms, and
Seabright (2004, p. 59-61) discusses smiling and laughing in connection with reciprocity.
With respect to the work ethic specically, Seabright (p. 5 and Chapter 6) suggests several
attributes that derive from education, training, and an extended period of commitment to
the task (the following is from p. 90-1):
almost all occupations in a modern society embody an ethic, a code. For trust requires
an assurance of reliability, and some of the most eective policemen are internal, lodged in the
surveillance mechanisms of the individual personality. The ercest external vigilance will rarely
be enough to ensure the honesty of a really determined cheat, so what better to deal with people
whose character, training, or upbringing leads them not to want to cheat even when they have
the chance? Those who can convince others of their intrinsic honesty may thereby prosper, and
it may be easier for the genuinely honest to be thus convincing | the more so if honesty, or at
least the true and honorable performance of a certain trade or skill, requires a degree of style,
condence, even grace, built up over a long period of commitment to the task, that are hard for
an opportunist to feign.
Like CM04, in this paper we assume that only the \genuinely honest" can credibly signal
such honesty and, for simplicity, omit the costs of such signaling.
Our focus on the work ethic is warranted by evidence from the Five Factor Model in
personality psychology, which identies the ve main personality traits as Agreeableness
(altruistic and optimistic), Conscientiousness (dutiful, self-disciplined, and achievement
oriented), Extraversion (assertive and sociable), Neuroticism (ability to cope with anxiety
and stress), and Openness to Experience (creative and imaginative). The work ethic is
subsumed under Conscientiousness, which is often assessed using the statement \I shirk my
duties." To determine the impact of each of the Big Five traits on job performance, Hurtz
and Donovan (2000) perform a meta-analysis of previous studies which considered jobs in
sales, customer service, management, and also skilled and semi-skilled positions. Their
ndings essentially conrm the conventional wisdom that Conscientiousness is the most
important. Agreeableness [which includes altruism as in CM04 and Rotemberg (2006)] is
also crucial for occupations like customer service involving substantial social interaction
(e.g., Rotemberg is concerned with relationships with contractors). Likewise, the meta-
analysis of Judge and Ilies (2002) reveals that Conscientiousness and Neuroticism are the
two most important factors for job motivation (e.g., choice of eort).
103. The Firm
In the rm, the agent's utility is
 expf r[I   C   GF]g (5)
with certainty equivalent [see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Chapter 4)]
UF =  + e   (1=2)t2   GF   RP; (6)
where the rst two terms are the agent's expected income and the last is the risk premium
RP = (1=2)k2. This represents the cost of risk imposed by incentives, where k = r2 is
the level of subjective risk. We assume   0 without loss of generality.8
The agent chooses his eorts to maximize (6) subject to e  0 and a  0. If  > 0





and the agent focuses exclusively on production. In that case, expected output is zero and






Although incentives are zero, the agent supplies non-zero total eort when v > 0 and  > 0
because he has internalized the principal's work ethic. Note that t in (8) is increasing in
both the work ethic v and the degree  of internalization.
To make the rm viable with zero incentives, HM91 (p. 33-4) assume C(t) is U-shaped
with minimum at t. The agent therefore provides total eort t when incentives are zero.
The latter corresponds to t in (8), which minimizes the U-shaped expression (1=2)t2+GF.
The dierence is that t is exogenous in HM91 and assumed to be equal in both institutions,
whereas in our model we use CM04 to make it endogenous.
8 Consider the second stage of the game when the institution is the rm and the agent chooses  to
maximize his material payo GF in (10). In what follows, we show that there exists a F > 0 such that
GF > 0 in that subgame (in fact, this holds for the subgame perfect outcome). Since GF  0 in those
subgames where  < 0, we focus on the case where   0.
11When the principal operates, the lump sum  is chosen to make the participation






which is increasing in v and . As in CM04, the agent therefore extracts rents from the
principal which are increasing in his degree of internalization. As we will see, these rents
are the source of potential employee buy-in and also explain why the principal sets a nite
(rather than innite) work ethic. The agent's material payo is his certainty equivalent in
(6) excluding guilt. Since the participation constraint binds,
   (1=2)t2 = GF (10)
and the agent's material payo is equivalent to his guilt.
We now turn to the principal's problem. Since the principal receives the nal value
of the asset, her prots are
q   q2 + f(a)   I (11)
and expected prots
minfe;ag   minfe;ag2 + f(a)      e   2 (12)
[see (2)]. Note that participation in the output market imposes risk 2 on the principal, who
will have to be compensated or she will shut down. Substituting the agent's participation
constraint and  = 0,
F = minfe;ag   minfe;ag2 + f(a)   (1=2)t2   GF   2: (13)




2   42 > 0; (14)
where the denominator is positive by Assumption 1.
12Proposition 1. If   F0 the principal oers a unique contract (F;F) and work ethic
















and the agent's material payo by
GF =
2
2(1 + 2)2: (18)
If 0   < F0 the principal shuts down and both parties receive zero.
Since incentives are necessarily zero because of the multi-tasking problem, the work
ethic is the sole potential source of motivation in the rm. The principal's expected prot
in (17) is increasing in the degree  of internalization and F = 0 at  = F0. The
principal therefore operates when the agent's commitment is suciently great   F0
and shuts down otherwise because total eort in (16) is insucient to cover the principal's
operating risk 2. The optimal work ethic vF in (15) re
ects a tradeo between higher
total eort in (8) versus a higher lump-sum payment  in (9). It is increasing in  but
decreasing in  because a greater degree of commitment allows the principal to achieve
the same total eort t in (8) with a lower v and therefore a lower . With zero incentives,
the agent is indierent between the two tasks and the principal allocates his total eort in
(16) between them. This allocative role of the principal is similar to the relational contract
described in Coase (1937, p. 391) and the exercise of authority in Simon (1951, p. 294).
Given that production is stochastic Leontief and  is the same for both tasks, the principal
divides (16) evenly between them.
In the second stage of the game the agent chooses  to maximize his material payo
GF.
13Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, the agent chooses  = F = 1=2 > F0 > 0 so the
principal operates. Furthermore,
eF = =8 aF = =8
F = 0 vF = 3=4
GF = 2=16 F = (2=8)   2 > 0:
(19)
The agent's optimal  balances the tradeo evident in (10), between greater rent
extraction  and the costs of higher total eort t. In equilibrium, the agent internalizes
the principal's work ethic F > 0 and internalizes it suciently F > F0 to enable the




minfe;ag   minfe;ag2 + f(a)   (1=2)t2 (20)
is e = a = =4. In comparison, the second best eorts in the rm are equal but less than
rst best. In that sense the rm provides \balanced" incentives, whereas we will show that
incentives are \unbalanced" in the market. If  = 1 the principal can achieve the rst
best by setting  = 0 and v = =2, so the agent chooses t = =2 to avoid innite guilt.
The degree of internalization is therefore less than complete in the sense that F < 1.
At the optimum, tF < vF and the agent indeed collects rents GF > 0. The principal also
benets from the exchange, since the multi-tasking problem precludes the use of incentives.
Note that Assumption 1 implies positive expected prot in (19).
In our model, the rm is a stylized institution which operates solely on the basis of
authority/relational contracts and intrinsic motivation as opposed to explicit monetary
incentives. In comparison, HM91 obtain a similar characterization of the rm under the
additional assumption that the least-cost total eort for the agent is non-zero. Without
this assumption, the rm is not viable because the multi-tasking problem implies zero
incentives. In this paper, we use the CM04 framework to make the least-cost total eort
endogenous and to establish the viability of the rm as an equilibrium phenomenon. Our
model therefore highlights and formalizes one of the central roles of management | the
development and maintenance of institutional culture.
144. The Market
In the market, the agent owns the asset and only experiences guilt in production on behalf
of the principal. The agent's utility is
 expf r[I + f(a)   C   GM]g (21)
with certainty equivalent
UM =  + e + f(a)   (1=2)t2   GM   (1=2)k2: (22)
Proposition 3. In the market, the agent's optimal eorts are given by
(Region 1) e = 0 and a = =3 when
  (=3)   v: (23)
(Region 2) e equals (7) and a = 0 when
  (1 + )   v: (24)
(Region 3)
e =
3( + v)   
2 + 3
a =




The agent devotes all of his attention to asset maintenance when incentives  are
suciently low (23), to production when incentives are suciently high (24), and engages
in both activities when incentives are medium (25). Since e = 0 and a = 0 imply zero
expected output, an operating principal chooses (;v) in region 3. In that case, an increase
in  raises the return on asset maintenance, which therefore increases at the expense of
production eort. An increase in production incentives  and/or the work ethic v has the
opposite eect. Although the eect of  is ambiguous, in equilibrium an increase in 
increases production eort and reduces asset maintenance [see Proposition 4 below].
The principal's prots are q   q2   I and expected prots
minfe;ag   minfe;ag2      e   2: (26)
15In the market, the agent's outside option is u, where 0  u  2=6 depending on asset
specicity. Substituting the participation constraint UM = u,
M = minfe;ag   minfe;ag2 + f(a)   (1=2)t2   GM   (1=2)k2   u   2: (27)
Since the participation constraint binds, the agent's material payo is
GM + u =  + e + f(a)   (1=2)t2   (1=2)k2: (28)
Let
M0 =
2(6 + k)(u + 2)   2(3   k)
3k[2   4(u + 2)]
: (29)
Proposition 4. If   M0 the principal oers the unique contract and work ethic
M =
3
6 + k(1 + 6)
vM =
[3 + k(5 + 3)]
2[6 + k(1 + 6)]
(30)
and the agent's optimal eorts are
eM =
[3 + k(3   1)]
2[6 + k(1 + 6)]
aM =
[3 + k(3 + 1)]
2[6 + k(1 + 6)]
: (31)
The principal's expected prots are
M =
2 [3 + k(3   1)]
2[6 + k(1 + 6)]
  u   2 (32)
and the agent's material payo is
u + GM =
9k22
2[6 + k(1 + 6)]
2 + u: (33)
If 0   < M0 the principal shuts down.
Proposition 4 reveals some qualitative dierences between the rm and the market.
First, in the market the agent owns the asset and will therefore maintain it when production
incentives are positive as long as  is not too high as in (24). Since the multi-tasking
problem in the rm no longer applies, incentives are zero in the rm but positive in the
market. Another qualitative dierence is that the agent is no longer indierent between
the two tasks, so the market does not involve allocative authority or relational contracts
16(except in the most trivial sense) which is a central feature of the rm. Finally, the market
provides \unbalanced" incentives when k > 0 in the sense that asset maintenance exceeds
production eort in (31) whereas the rst best requires them to be the same.
Since incentives in (30) are decreasing in subjective risk k, the classical risk-reward
tradeo continues to hold in this model. This is because an increase in subjective risk
increases the agent's risk premium and therefore the cost of incentives. An increase in
commitment  reduces both incentives and the work ethic because the principal can achieve
the same level of production eort with less risk and less guilt, both of which require
compensation. An increase in k reduces incentives but increases the work ethic in (30)
because the latter are strategic substitutes [see (A.16) in the proof]. Indeed, (25) shows
the principal can increase production eort by increasing incentives and/or the work ethic.
The principal operates when   M0 and shuts down otherwise, so M0 is the
minimum necessary level of commitment in the market. Since M0 is increasing in the
agent's outside option u, the market requires more commitment when the asset is less
specic to generate enough expected prot to cover an increasingly stringent participation
constraint. The necessary minimum M0 is also increasing in the agent's degree r of
risk aversion and 2 (the last result requires Assumption 1), which increase the cost of
incentives and/or the principal's risk associated with the output market.
In the classical literature (e.g., Weber), the market is often depicted as an essentially
\cold" institution. In contrast, the eminent sociologist  Emile Durkheim argued that pure
contractual relations cannot exist or be studied separately from moral considerations:
economic phenomena cannot be adequately studied in the manner of classical economic theory,
as if these were separate from the moral norms and beliefs which govern the life of individuals in
society. There is no society (nor could there conceivably be a society) where economic relationships
are not subject to customary and legal regulation. That is to say, as Durkheim was later to express
the matter in The Division of Labor, \a contract is not sucient unto itself."
Giddens (1971, p. 69)
In our model, the picture is less clear. If




then M0  0 and the market can operate without any intrinsic motivation. On the other
hand, \a contract is not sucient unto itself" when (34) does not hold and M0 > 0. In
17that case, the market is not a viable institution without a sucient degree of commitment.
This is because the market is characterized by its own multi-tasking problem which is
dierent from that in the rm | in the market, the agent faces ownership incentives
with respect to asset maintenance but the principal cannot provide such incentives for
production and still make a positive expected prot. An eective work ethic is therefore
necessary to motivate a sucient amount of production eort.
We now turn to the agent's optimal choice of  in the market. Let
rM 
12[2   4(u + 2)]
2[2 + 8(u + 2)]
: (35)














8(6+k)   u   2:
(36)
(ii) If r > rM the optimal  is M0 > 0 and
eMc = u+
2

















22 Mc = 0:
(37)
(iii) As k ! 0 the market converges to the rst best.
The agent's material payo is (33) when the principal operates and u otherwise. If
r  rM then r and/or 2 are relatively low and so is the required level of commitment
M0  M. Since M is the unconstrained maximizer for (33), the agent chooses the
latter. In contrast, M < M0 when r > rM so the principal shuts down when  = M. In
that case, the agent chooses M0 and gives up some rents so the principal can operate. In
either case, the agent internalizes the principal's work ethic  > 0 and does so to the extent
necessary   M0 to make the market viable. Since GM > 0 and GMc > 0, the agent
extracts rents from the principal, who also benets from the exchange because incentives
alone cannot solve the market's multi-tasking problem. As k ! 0 the market approaches
the rst best, whereas the rm can never do so.
In HM91, an exogenous amount of intrinsic motivation is assumed to make the rm
viable with zero incentives. In this paper, we have shown that this assumption is also
18necessary for the market, which is not viable without intrinsic motivation when r > r0.
The combination of HM91 and CM04 makes the viability of both institutions endogenous
and a result, rather than an assumption, of the theory. We have also shown that the
assumption that the level of intrinsic motivation is the same in both institutions is articial
and restrictive since the ethical variables  and v clearly dier across institutions. We now
turn to a detailed examination of those dierences.
5. Ethical Comparisons
We consider three dierent denitions of what it means for one institution to be more
ethical than another.
Denition 1. One institution is more ethical than another if (ME1) v and  are higher in
that institution. (ME2) Production eort evaluated at zero incentives and the equilibrium
v and  are higher in that institution. (ME3) Guilt is higher in that institution.
According to ME1, one institution is more ethical than another if both ethical variables
are higher in that institution. Although an obvious denition to make, in our view what is
important is not so much the relative magnitudes of the ethical variables but rather their
eects, which is the focus of ME2 and ME3. The second denition compares equilibrium
production eort in the rm (19) with production eort in the market (25) evaluated at
 = 0 and (M;vM) in (36) or (Mc;vMc) in (37) as the case may be. This compares the
instrumental ecacy of the ethical variables in terms of production eort in each institution
after controlling for positive incentives in the market. According to ME3, one institution
is more ethical than another if equilibrium guilt (the eect of the ethical variables in terms
of rent extraction) is higher in that institution.
Direct Comparison When Institutions Are Exogenous
In experiments, the institution (e.g., the extensive form of an ultimatum game) is often
exogenous and dictated by the experimenter.9 Institutions are also exogenous in the short
9 Exceptions include Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2007), where principals were free to choose among
incentive, bonus, and trust contracts.
19run or when inecient institutions are buttressed (e.g., for political purposes) or allowed
to persist for whatever reason.
We rst compare the ethical variables (;v) across institutions when , r, and 2 are
the same in each. Let re = 3=(52), rF = 3=2, and rv = 24=(52).
Proposition 6. Assume , r, and 2 are the same in both institutions. (i) M > F
when r < rF, F > M when rF < r < rM, and F > M0 when r > rM. (ii) vF > vM
when r < rv, vM > vF when rv < r < rM, and vMc > vF when r > rM.
Figure 1 below summarizes.
Figure 1 Goes Here
Since incentives and the work ethic are strategic substitutes for the principal (see the
second paragraph following Proposition 4 above), a decrease in subjective risk k increases
the former and reduces the latter. As the work ethic vM declines, the agent increases his
commitment M to shore up his declining rents GM. When k is suciently small in the
sense that k < 3 or r < rF, the work ethic vM in the market falls below that vF in the
rm and M exceeds F. In fact, M ! 1 as k ! 0. The opposite results obtain when k
is suciently large.
We now compare the rm and the market on the basis of the three ethical criteria in
Denition 1.
Proposition 7. Assume , r, and 2 are the same in both institutions. (i) The rm is
ME1 than the market when rF < r < rv. Otherwise, the ME1 ranking is ambiguous. (ii)
The rm is ME2 when r > re and the market ME2 when r < re. (iii) The rm is ME3
when r < rF and the market ME3 when r > rF.
The rst result is immediate from Proposition 6 and Figure 1. The second follows
because the market converges to the rst best as k ! 0 and in the limit production eort is
completely determined by the work ethic. To see this, note that k ! 0 implies M ! 1 in
Proposition 5 and e ! v as  ! 1 in (25). At k = 0, the ethical component of production
eort is therefore maximized [see (A.26) in the appendix], so the market is ME2 than the
rm when k is suciently small. From (36), guilt GM ! 0 as k ! 0 and the work ethic
20declines in favor of stronger incentives. As a result, the rm is ME3 than the market when
k is suciently small.
The results are therefore ambiguous and contradictory when institutions are exogenous
because the rm is ME2 when k is suciently large but ME3 when k is suciently small.
We now show that a much sharper characterization emerges when institutions are allowed
to be endogenous.
Endogenous Institutions
In the long run, the ecient institution should prevail because it generates more expected
surplus to divide between the parties. A comparison between observed institutions will
therefore be a comparison between ecient ones. Since generically there is only one ecient
institution for each (;r;2) combination, the previous results for the exogenous case
involved comparisons between ecient and inecient institutions.
In the rst stage of the game when the institution is chosen, the selsh inner self's
material payo is ui + Gi and the principal's expected prot is i, where i = F;M;Mc
and ui = u for i = M;Mc and ui = 0 for i = F. The ecient institution has the highest
expected total payo Vi = i + ui + Gi.
Proposition 8. Assume  is the same in both institutions. (i) VM > VF when r < rF,
VF > VM when rF < r < rM, and VF > VMc when r > rM. (ii) An ecient market
has a higher degree of internalization M > F and a lower work ethic vM < vF than an
ecient rm. (iii) An ecient market is ME2 when r < re and an ecient rm is ME2
when r > re. (iv) An ecient rm is always ME3 than an ecient market.
The rst result extends HM91 to the case of endogenous intrinsic motivation and
participation constraints. On the one hand, the rm's multi-tasking problem precludes
the use of incentives and ensures that it can never be rst best. On the other hand,
the rm provides balanced incentives with zero risk, whereas the market's multi-tasking
problem ensures the opposite. Since the market converges to the rst best as k ! 0, the
market is ecient when k is suciently small in the sense that r < rF or k < 3. The rm
is ecient when r > rF and the asset is suciently specic so that Assumption 1 holds.
21The existence of rms (to return to the questions with which this paper began) is therefore
due to asset specicity and unbalanced incentives and excessive risk in markets.
The second result shows that the ME1 ranking is maximally ambiguous in the sense
that the work ethic v is always higher in an ecient rm, whereas internalization  is always
higher in an ecient market. According to (iii) and (iv), an ecient rm is always ME3
than an ecient market and is also ME2 when r > re. In contrast, an ecient market is
never unambiguously more ethical than an ecient rm. This relative consistency between
ME2 and ME3 when institutions are endogenous contrasts sharply with the exogenous case.
We should therefore observe markets with strong performance incentives but weak
intrinsic motivation when subjective risk is relatively low re < r < rF, but rms with weak
incentives and strong intrinsic motivation when asset specicity and subjective risk are high
in the sense that r > rF and Assumption 1 holds. In the latter case, the rm is superior
because it provides balanced incentives, fosters intrinsic motivation, and economizes on
risk. These are aspects of both the scope and function of rms. The sole possible exception
to this characterization is the case r < re where the market is close to the rst best.
The classical notion that institutions shape preferences becomes incomplete at best
when institutions are endogenous. Although institutions in
uence the choice of incentives,
eorts, and even ethics, the choice of institution in turn depends on preferences (the degree
r of risk aversion) and economic fundamentals (objective risk 2). This mutual interaction
between the economic base and preferences was a central theme in Durkheim:
One can understand nothing of the rules of morality that govern property, contract, work,
etc., if one does not know the economic causes which underlie them; and, conversely, one would
arrive at a completely false notion of economic development if one neglected the moral causes
which in
uenced it.
Durkheim quoted in Giddens (1973, p. 69).
In our model, it is more accurate to say that individuals in
uence their own preferences
through the institutions they design and/or join.
Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) conduct a series of experiments to determine the eects
of money (not incentives, but the concept of money) on social behavior. In one experiment
(experiment 7), subjects lled out a questionnaire by computer. After 6 minutes, a third
of subjects (randomly assigned) saw a screensaver involving money, another third saw a
22screensaver involving sh, and the nal third saw a blank screen. Afterwards, subjects
were asked to pull two chairs together to meet another participant. Those who saw the
money screensaver kept the two chairs furthest apart. In another experiment (experiment
5), a confederate of the experimenters pretended to spill a box of pencils within view of the
subject. Those who were \primed" with money (similar to the money screensaver) picked
up the fewest pencils. All nine experiments had similar outcomes: \participants primed
with money preferred to play alone, work alone, and put more physical distance between
themselves and a new acquaintance" (p. 1154). The explanation in Sobel (2008) and
related papers does not seem to apply, since the institutional framework of the experiment
did not constrain behavior. A natural interpretation, in line with Bowles (1998), is that
the same individual can have dierent sets of preferences which are optimal in dierent
institutions and that sensory cues involving money activated those preferences associated
with money and markets. Although these experiments did not address intrinsic motivation,
this interpretation is also broadly consistent with the approach in this paper.
Finally, we consider the case where the agent's outside option u in the market violates
Assumption 1.








the rm is never ecient.
Since expected prots in (19) are positive, the rm is still a viable institution. Given
the rst condition, the second inequality in (38) imposes a lower bound on u such that
Assumption 1 is violated and the market is always ecient. Intuitively, an increase in the
agent's outside option raises the minimum necessary level M0 of internalization so the
principal can make the required payment u. This increase in commitment raises the value
VMc obtained in the market, which eventually exceeds that VF in the rm.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed two classical and fundamental questions. What is the nature
of the rm? In reality, rms employ a variety of dierent incentive mechanisms, but in
23this paper our desire was to emphasize in stark relief what we believe to be an important
dierence between rms and markets | institutional culture and social exchange. This
leads to our second question, discussed at length by Smith, Marx, Durkheim, Weber,
and many other classical thinkers. To what extent do markets re
ect more than naked
self-interest and what is their impact on preferences?
Our starting point was the well-known multi-tasking theory of the rm in Holmstr om
and Milgrom (1991). Although that model explains why incentives are low-powered in
rms, it falls short of a fully-
edged theory of the rm in that the viability of the latter is
assumed in the form of an exogenous and positive least-cost total eort which the agent
supplies even when incentives are zero. Moreover, the assumption that the agent's intrinsic
motivation is the same in the rm and the market is particularly egregious in light of the
aforementioned classical debates. In this paper, we used the theory of intrinsic motivation
in Casadesus-Masanell (2004) to complete the multi-tasking theory of the rm. Since
the latter paper eectively endogenizes the agent's least-cost action, this completion is
a parsimonious one which preserves the essential structure of the original multi-tasking
framework.
In our model, the rm operates solely on the basis of endogenous intrinsic motivation
rather than monetary incentives. Since incentives are balanced, the agent is indierent
between the two tasks and the principal exercises allocative authority as in Simon (1951)
or the relational contracts in Coase (1937). In equilibrium, the agent receives material
rents from the principal in exchange for a suciently high degree of internalization to
ensure positive expected prots. The viability of the rm is therefore a result rather than
an assumption of the model. In contrast, the market suers from its own multi-tasking
problem, dierent from that in the rm, which requires high-powered incentives to oset
the agent's ownership incentives for asset maintenance. When subjective risk is suciently
high, incentives need to be supplemented with intrinsic motivation and the market cannot
operate otherwise. In equilibrium, the market is characterized by an eective work ethic
and therefore re
ects more than pure self-interest. Ultimately, however, such commitment
is also an expression of material self-interest.
We showed that the rm is more ecient than the market when asset specicity and
24subjective risk are suciently high. In that case, the rm is the superior institution because
it provides balanced incentives, fosters intrinsic motivation, and economizes on risk. Our
paper therefore provides new insights on the existence, scope, and function of rms. We
then showed that an ecient rm is more ethical than an ecient market in the sense
that the ethical component of production eort and the material rents extracted by the
agent in exchange for commitment are both higher in the rm (except when the market
approximates the rst best). In our model, the market is therefore primarily an incentive
system while the rm is an intrinsic motivation device.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting (8) into (13), the principal's problem is to choose e  0, a  0, and v  0 to
maximize
















Note that e and a are chosen by the principal, while t in (8) is the actual total eort
supplied by the agent. It is therefore t in (8) that enters C(t) and GF. Since expected
revenue and asset value are decreasing after =2, we may assume without loss of generality
that 0  e  =2, 0  a  =2, and







where the latter follows from (8) and t  . A solution therefore exists because we have a
continuous function on a compact set. At the optimum (A.2) must bind because otherwise
the principal could increase expected prot by reducing v with e and a held xed. The
optimum cannot entail e > a because the principal could increase expected prot by
reducing e and increasing a by an equivalent amount. Likewise, it cannot entail a > e
because an increase in e would increase the principal's expected revenue [the rst two
25terms in (A.1)] more than an equivalent decrease in a would reduce asset value because of
diminishing returns. It follows that e = a at the optimum. Substituting e = a = t=2 into















The solution is (15) and the rest follow from straightforward substitutions. Since F in
(17) is strictly increasing in  and F = 0 at  = F0, the principal operates when   F0
and shuts down otherwise.






2(1 + 2)3; (A:5)
GF = 0 at  = 0, increases to its maximum at F = 1=2, and then decreases thereafter.
From Proposition 1, the agent's material payo is GF in (18) when   F0 and zero
otherwise because the principal shuts down. Assumption 1 implies




The rest follows from straightforward substitutions.
Proof of Proposition 3
From (22), the rst-order conditions are
e :    e   a + (v   e)  0 (A:7)
a :    e   3a  0 (A:8)
with complementary slackness. If e = 0 and a > 0 (Region 1) then (A.8) implies a = =3
and (A.7) implies (23). If e > 0 and a = 0 (Region 2) then (A.7) implies (7) and (A.8)
implies e   or (24). If e > 0 and a > 0 (Region 3) then (A.7) and (A.8) imply (25).
Along the boundaries the solutions agree.
26Proof of Proposition 4
If (;v) is in regions 1 or 2 in Proposition 3 (including their boundaries with region 3),
expected revenue in (2) is negative and the principal prefers to shut down. We now divide





and e  a otherwise. Re-written as equations, (23), (24), and (A.9) are lines with the
same slope in v but dierent vertical intercepts for . Since
=3 < (2 + )=4 < (1 + ); (A:10)
the line in (A.9) lies between those in (23) and (24) and indeed splits region 3. Suppose
(;v) is such that e > a in region 3 and consider a small reduction in v with  held xed.
Since e > a, a small reduction in v which leads to a small decrease in e and a small increase
in a will increase both expected revenue in (2) and asset value. From (25),
t =




v   e =
2v   3 + 
2 + 3
; (A:12)
so the agent's cost of eort and guilt both fall. The agent's risk premium is unaected,
so expected prots in (27) increase. It follows that the principal never chooses (;v) in
region 3 such that e > a. We now consider e < a in region 3 where
M = e   e2 + f(a)   (1=2)t2   GM   (1=2)k2   u   2: (A:13)
Substituting (25), after some tedious algebra


















2(2+3)2 + u + 2
(A:15)
27and A-E are all positive. Since M in (A.14) is continuous and region 3 where e  a is
nonempty and compact, a solution to the principal's problem exists. Note that
@2M
@@v
=  C < 0; (A:16)
so incentives and the work ethic are strategic substitutes for the principal as claimed in
the text. Since
@2M











4[6 + k(1 + 6)]
(2 + 3)2 > 0; (A:18)
(A.14) is strictly concave in (;v) and the solution is unique. The rst-order conditions
are linear, so (30) follows from straightforward calculations. Evaluating (23) at (30), we
obtain
   (=3) + v =
(2 + 3)[3 + k(3   1)]
6[6 + k(1 + 6)]
; (A:19)




+ v =  
k(2 + 3)
4[6 + k(1 + 6)]
< 0; (A:20)
so (30) is never in region 2 or region 3 with e > a. Expressions (31)-(33) follow from
straightforward substitutions. In particular, M  0 i   M0. Since
M0   R1 =
2(u + 2)
2   4(u + 2)
> 0; (A:21)
  M0 implies (30) is in the interior of the subregion of region 3 where e  a with
M  0 and is therefore the global optimum for the principal.
Proof of Proposition 5




92k2[6 + k(1   6)]
2[6 + k(1 + 6)]3 (A:22)
28to nd the unique unconstrained maximizer M dened in the statement. Since
M   M0 =
2(12   k)   8(6 + k)
 
u + 2
6k[2   4(u + 2)]
(A:23)
is strictly decreasing in r and zero at r = rM, it follows that M  M0 when r  rM and
M < M0 otherwise. In the former case, the agent chooses M because GM evaluated at
 = M in (36) is nonnegative and positive for all k > 0, whereas the principal shuts down
for all 0   < M0. In the latter case, the agent chooses M0 because GM evaluated
there in (37) is positive and decreasing for all   M0, whereas again the principal shuts
down for all 0   < M0, including M. The expressions in (36) and (37) follow from
straightforward substitutions for  in Proposition 4. To prove (iii), we note that k ! 0
implies r ! 0, 2 ! 0, or both. Since rM ! 1 as 2 ! 0, we must eventually have
r  rM in all three cases, so (36) is relevant rather than (37). At k = 0, eM = aM = =4
(the rst best eort levels) and guilt and the risk premium in (27) are both zero.
Proof of Propositions 6-8
Since






52 [2 + 8(u + 2)]
> 0 (A:24)
by Assumption 1, 0 < re < rF < rv < rM as in Figure 1 above. We rst consider
0  r  rM, where  = M in the market. Since




we have VM > VF when k < 3 or r < rF and VF > VM when r > rF as in Figure 1.
Likewise,




GF   GM =
2(3   k)
8(6 + k)
M   F =
3   k
3k




29Since k < 24=5 is equivalent to r < rv, the comparison between vF and vM follows.














Since k < 3=5 is equivalent to r < re, the comparison between e
=0
M and eF follows. We
now consider r  rM, where  = M0 in the market. At r = rM,














2(r)2 > 0: (A:30)
If we can show that
lim
r!1








482 > 0 (A:31)
then the result will follow. The numerator in (A.31) is strictly decreasing in z = u + 2
and zero at z = (2=8)(2 +
p











which holds by Assumption 1. Clearly,
F   Mc = F > 0 (A:33)
and




















GMc > GF for all r  rM. Likewise,




4[2   4(u + 2)]
> 0 (A:37)
at r = rM,
@M0
@r
= 1=(r)2 > 0; (A:38)
and
lim




6[2   4(u + 2)]
> 0; (A:39)




4   2(7 + k)
 
u + 2
+ 2(6 + k)
 
u + 22
3(1   k)   2(2   k)(u + 2)
: (A:40)





















[2(1   k)   2(2   k)(u + 2)]












112   32(u + 2)
< 0 (A:43)



















Mc < eF for all r  rM. Figure 1 summarizes all these comparisons.
31Proof of Proposition 9
The rm is still a viable institution because 2 > 82 implies F > 0 in (19). Since






2 [2 + 8(u + 2)]
< 0; (A:46)
VM > VF for all 0  r  rM. From (A.29), VMc > VF at r = rM and (A.30) VMc is
increasing while VF is constant. It follows that VMc > VF for all r  rM.
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vF < vMc
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